INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, the most the consumer expected out of his or her morning glass of juice was a little extra vitamin C. By 2010, the consumer expected a lot more. POM Wonderful's pomegranate juice, for instance, promised to improve cardiovascular health, treat erectile dysfunction, and combat prostate cancer. 1 Those claims made orange juice look a little pathetic. Of course, those wild promises also landed POM Wonderful in hot water with the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") for misleading the public with scientifically unsubstantiated health claims.
2 POM Wonderful, like many food manufacturers, sought to capitalize on the American consumers' quest for the panacea: the magic-bullet food product. The 3 number of health claims made by food producers has skyrocketed in recent years. Whether the consumer can rely on these claims as true and scientifically 4 supported is an open question. Although federal administrative agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and the FTC have authority to police health claims on product labels and in product advertising, these agencies lack the resources to do so fully. Lanham Act claims and consumer state law claims 5 can fill this regulatory void, but these lawsuits are often met with the affirmative 6 defenses of preclusion, preemption, and primary jurisdiction-doctrines that, if successful, take claims out of the hands of private parties and place them back in the lap of the FDA, an agency that cannot pursue every scientifically shaky health claim. Moreover, the preclusion and primary jurisdiction doctrines create 7 interagency jurisdictional questions between the FDA and the FTC-the two agencies expressly authorized to regulate food health claims. 8 Even where courts decline to apply these jurisdictional doctrines, parties spend an inordinate amount of time addressing them in pretrial motions, thereby delaying resolution on the merits. The uneven system of federal enforcement, 9 coupled with the vexing jurisdictional objections posed by defendants in opposition to both private litigation and FTC enforcement actions, leads to a tortured and woefully inefficient system of food health claim regulation. The 10 solution is to remove the jurisdictional barriers to private lawsuits where plaintiffs seek to enforce the federal food labeling requirements by eliminating the express preemption provision in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act ("NLEA") and creating a private right of action for NLEA violations. In (2015) (discussing the defenses of preemption and primary jurisdiction in the context of food labeling litigation).
9. See id. at 849 ("The determination of whether petitioners' claims are preempted in food labeling cases takes an enormous amount of resources--those of the parties litigating the claim and the judiciary. The express preemption provisions of the NLEA and the interaction between the NLEA's requirements and the balance of the FDCA are complex and difficult to parse."). would allow better coordination of agency enforcement.
Part I of this Article discusses the legal pressure points that bear on food health claims on labels and in advertisements, from both a federal regulatory standpoint and a private enforcement standpoint. Part II discusses the doctrines of preclusion, preemption, and primary jurisdiction in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. This 12 section explains how these doctrines create jurisdictional hurdles for private parties-and even the FTC-when they challenge health representations on food labels. In particular, Part II discusses the recently filed case of Federal Trade Commission v. Gerber Products Co., in which the preclusion and primary 13 jurisdiction doctrines were raised in an effort to thwart the FTC's authority to challenge health claims that have been regulated-at least in part-by the FDA.
14 Part III of this Article analyzes these jurisdictional doctrines and makes policy recommendations regarding the appropriate balance between federal regulation, private litigation, and interagency enforcement efforts with regard to food health claims. The Article concludes with industry guidance.
I. REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT FOOD AND HEALTH: REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
Representations about the health benefits of a food are regulated in two ways. First, there is an extensive federal regulatory scheme applicable to food 15 labels and advertisements. Food labels must comply with the requirements set 16 forth by the FDA. Representations made in advertisements and promotional 17 materials are subject to enforcement actions by the FTC. Second, there is 18 potential civil liability arising from private litigation involving misleading health claims. In particular, competitors may pursue Lanham Act claims if they have 19 been injured due to the defendant manufacturer's misrepresentations. 20 Additionally, individual consumers may challenge food-related misrepresentations under state consumer protection statutes or any other number of state law causes of action; the number of these cases has increased in recent years. Each of these forces bears on manufacturer conduct and is discussed in 14. 
A. Federal Regulation
For well over fifty years, the FDA and the FTC have shared enforcement authority with regard to the misbranding of food. Pursuant to an agreement 22 between the agencies, the FDA has "primary responsibility for preventing misbranding of foods . . . [and] will exercise primary jurisdiction over all matters regulating the labeling of foods." The FTC, on the other hand, has "primary 23 responsibility with respect to the regulation of the truth or falsity of all advertising (other than labeling) of foods." The agencies also agree to engage 24 in liaison activities where "[t]he same, or similar claims are found in both labeling and advertising." Thus, the FDA and the FTC have traditionally 25 divided labor with regard to representations about food and health as follows: the FDA handles claims on labels; the FTC handles claims in advertising. only did the NLEA give consumers the now-familiar "nutrition facts" panels on 33 food packaging, but it also authorized the FDA to regulate other aspects of food labels, such as claims regarding the health benefits or nutritional value of the product. 34 1990, the amount of litigation involving food labeling has increased).
22 In particular, the FDA regulates three types of claims under the NLEA: nutrient content claims, structure/function claims, and health claims. A nutrient 35 content claim "characterizes the level of a nutrient in the food (e.g., 'low fat,' 'high in oat bran,' or 'contains 100 calories')." A manufacturer may assert only 36 those nutrient content claims that have been approved by the FDA.
37
Structure/function claims, on the other hand, do not have to be approved by the FDA prior to use on a product label so long as they are "truthful and not misleading." These claims "focus on effects derived from nutritive value" in the 38 food. For example, a food product's assertion that "calcium builds strong 39 bones" is a structure/function claim. 40 The third category of claims regulated by the FDA is health claims, which assert that the risk of a disease or health condition is lessened by a substance in the product. For example, the FDA has approved the following health claim 41 describing the relationship between calcium and osteoporosis: "Calcium and Osteoporosis: Adequate calcium throughout life, as part of a well-balanced diet, may reduce the risk of osteoporosis." FDA approval is required for all health 42 claims on food labels. It is important to note that health claims can only assert 43 a reduced risk of disease; a claim that asserts a connection between 44 consumption of the food and the "cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease" results in the food being treated as a drug under the FDCA and thus subjects the food to the FDA's regulations regarding drug labeling.
45
A health claim can either be "authorized," which requires a showing that the claim is supported by "significant scientific agreement," or it can be 46 "qualified," which requires a lesser showing of "credible" evidence. is met, the FDA considers the number of studies relevant to the claim, the methodological quality of those studies, the studies' outcomes, the degree to which those outcomes are consistent, and the relevance to the U.S. population.
49
While conclusive evidence is not required, the FDA will generally approve the health claim only if there appears to be near-consensus in the scientific community regarding the validity of the claim. Historically, the significant 50 scientific agreement standard has been hard to satisfy. standard, the FDA authorizes the claim through issuance of a rule. A health 59 claim that fails to meet the significant scientific agreement standard will not be approved. If, however, the FDA finds that the health claim is nonetheless 60 supported by credible evidence, the FDA may issue a letter to the manufacturer outlining the circumstances under which the FDA may refrain from enforcement activity pursuant to its discretion. Such a letter also informs the manufacturer 61 of the disclaiming language that must appear on the label. If the FDA 62 determines that the claim is not supported by either the significant scientific agreement standard or the credible evidence standard, the FDA will deny the petition. A manufacturer that makes false or misleading representations 63 regarding health claims has engaged in "misbranding" in violation of the FDCA.
64
The FDA engages in comparatively little food health claim enforcement activity in light of the staggering number of products it is expected to regulate.
65
The FDA is burdened with regulating eighty percent of the United States' food supply. Although the FDA has authority to issue injunctions and impose 66 monetary penalties, the FDA is authorized to do so only when it appears that a serious safety concern is at issue; misleading health claims on food products do not rise to this level. Instead, the agency's primary enforcement mechanism is 67 the issuance of warning letters that request that the manufacturer voluntarily correct its behavior. The efficacy of these letters is in serious doubt. 65. See Black, supra note 35, at 11 ("As the agency tasked with so many diverse and wideranging areas, the FDA has a reputation for being overworked, underfunded, and incapable of effectively governing its responsibilities."); see also Negowetti, supra note 4, at 3 ("Although the FDA is responsible for enforcing labeling regulations, it lacks the enforcement authority to effectively deter food companies from making misleading claims.").
66. See Negowetti, supra note 4, at 2. The U.S. Department of Agriculture regulates the remaining food products, including meat, eggs, and poultry. labeling guidelines gets put on the back burner.
Commentators have been sharply critical of the FDA's ability to regulate food labeling given its lack of resources compared to the volume of products it must oversee. These concerns are deepened by the fact that the FDA's policies 72 and priorities are subject to change with the political climate, often at the expense of the consumer:
Such subjectivity leads to inconsistent, capricious decisions at the whim of whichever political party is in power. The consumer, who likely lacks knowledge of the agency's arbitrariness, endures the consequences of the FDA's lack of perpetual lucidity and is bound by regulations that may or may not reflect the consumer's true desires.
73
Nor can the consumer easily take matters into his or her own hands when a manufacturer fails to conform to the FDA's labeling requirements, as there is no private right of action to enforce the NLEA. This statute delegates authority to the FTC to promulgate rules and issue guidance regarding acts that constitute deceptive practices. In the context of 77 deceptive advertising, the FTC considers the content of the advertisement, whether the representations made are "false, misleading or unsubstantiated," and whether a consumer would find those representations to be material in deciding whether to purchase the product.
78
Unlike the FDA's preapproval process for health claims on food labels, the FTC does not preapprove health claims in advertisements; rather, the FTC regulates unsubstantiated claims through enforcement actions. standard, the FTC follows a "competent and reliable scientific evidence" standard. The FTC has defined the competent and reliable scientific evidence 81 standard to mean "tests, analyses, research, studies, or other evidence based on the expertise of professionals in the relevant area, that have been conducted and evaluated in an objective manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable results."
82
In an action challenging a manufacturer's health claims, the FTC begins by determining whether the advertisement is making "efficacy claims" or "establishment claims." The level of substantiation required for a health claim 83 depends on this categorization. Efficacy claims do not purport to be 84 scientifically established; rather, they simply suggest "that a product successfully performs the advertised function or yields the advertised benefit." An advertiser 85 making an efficacy claim need only show that it possessed a "reasonable basis" for the assertion. To evaluate whether such a reasonable basis exists, the FTC 86 considers several factors, including the type of product and claim, the benefits of a truthful claim, the consequences of a false claim, "the ease of developing substantiation for the claim," and, "the amount of substantiation experts in the field would consider reasonable." Establishment claims, on the other hand, 87 suggest, "that a product's effectiveness or superiority has been scientifically established." A higher level of scientific substantiation is required for 88 establishment claims. If the claim makes a "specific" reference to a particular 89 type of substantiation, then the advertiser must be able to produce that type of substantiation. "Non-specific" claims, such as a representation that the claim 90 is "medically proven," must be supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy the relevant scientific community that the claim is true.
91
The level of scientific substantiation required to support health claims in advertisements received significant analysis by the D.C. Id. at 502-03. Because the FTC narrowly defined an "unqualified" health claim as any representation without an unambiguous disclaimer stating that the evidence is "inconclusive" or that "additional research is necessary," a disclaimer using the words "preliminary" or "initial" would be prohibited unless it were supported by two RCTs. Thus, even a health claim supported by one RCT and characterized as "preliminary" would be insufficient. Accordingly, the public could be denied access to a health claim that was supported by the "gold standard" of research: one RCT. The court found that the FTC failed to demonstrate that the requirement of a second RCT would yield enough benefit to overcome this hurdle. (2015) ; see also Ledyard, supra note 4, at 794-95 (noting recent FTC trend to rely on consent orders to "leverage" companies into "greater compliance").
112. See Ledyard, supra note 4, at 794. may pursue a manufacturer that uses a nutrient content claim in an advertisement in a manner that is "inconsistent with FDA's definitions." In addition, the FTC 115 may be faced with a health claim in an advertisement that is also subject to the FDA's petition process for an authorized or qualified health claim. Under these 116 circumstances, the FTC generally defers to the FDA's determination of scientific substantiation for the health claim. Qualified health claims, however, are a 117 different matter. The FTC recognizes that there may be circumstances where a producer does not have FDA approval to make a qualified health claim on a food label, but the manufacturer may nonetheless be able to make such a representation in an advertisement under the FTC's "competent and reliable scientific evidence" standard. Where the FDA has not acted, the FTC will 118 make its own determination regarding the adequacy of the scientific support for the claim and its accompanying disclaimer. The FTC claims that it closely 119 monitors qualified health claims in advertisements to ensure their reliability:
The Commission will therefore be especially vigilant in examining whether qualified claims are presented in a manner that ensures that consumers understand both the extent of the support for the claim and the existence of any significant contrary view within the scientific community. In the absence of adequate qualification, the Commission will find such claims deceptive. 120 Thus, the FTC will generally defer to the FDA where the FDA has affirmatively recognized a health claim, qualified health claim, or nutrient content claim, but in the absence of such FDA action, the FTC will engage in its own analysis to assess the claim's validity. (1) The defendant has made false or misleading statements of fact concerning his own product or another's; (2) the statement actually or tends to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience; (3) the statement is material in that it will likely influence the deceived consumer's purchasing decisions; (4) the advertisements were introduced into interstate commerce; and (5) 131. See id. ("The majority of these lawsuits are punitive class action lawsuits brought by plaintiff lawyers, representing the class members.").
II. JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
Food health claims are thus shaped by competing forces: regulation by the FDA on product labels; enforcement actions by the FTC for unsubstantiated representations in advertisements; private lawsuits from competitors who claim that misrepresentations regarding a product's health benefits interfere with the market; and private lawsuits from consumers who claim that they were induced to purchase products they otherwise would have passed in the grocery aisle. Although each of these forces does, in theory, incentivize food producers to be honest about their products, they are also the source of jurisdictional confusion when they converge over the same representation.
First, defendants commonly raise jurisdictional defenses where the food health claim is subject to both regulation by the FDA and lawsuits from private actors.
The 2015) . In this case, the plaintiff manufactured an injectable vasopressin product, which was FDA-approved. Id. at *2. The defendant also manufactured a vasopressin injectable, but it was not FDA-approved. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant marketed and otherwise created the impression that its product was FDA-approved. Id. at *5. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was seeking to enforce the FDCA through a Lanham Act claim; the court disagreed, finding that "the dispute is of the sort with which the Lanham Act is concerned to the extent it involves deception of consumers as to the fact of whether a product carries the imprimatur of FDA approval." Id. at *11. In addition, " [FDA approval is] a sort of "Good Housekeeping Seal" for pharmaceuticals: it is the government's imprimatur on a product, indicating quality, safety, and desirability . . . if a product has been approved, consumers may take some assurance that it has been properly tested and meets the agency's minimum quality standards. This makes an FDA-approved product a more attractive product, whether at the wholesale, retail, or end user level. But it can also be expensive to get approval for a drug, so a company that chooses to invest in getting approval may operate at a competitive disadvantage if other companies can falsely represent to the public that their unapproved products are FDA-approved. Thus, representations that a drug is approved when it is not undermine the Lanham Act's public policy goals both by confusing consumers and by enabling unfair competition by producers who have not bothered to get FDA approval. found that the preclusion doctrine barred a Lanham Act suit that alleged that the defendant was required to seek FDA approval for its medical device and it failed 12.
175. 52 F. Supp. 3d 992 (C.D. Cal. 2014). In this case, the plaintiff manufactured an injectable epinephrine product and obtained FDA approval for its product under the brand name Adrenalin. Id. at 996. The defendants also manufactured injectable epinephrine products, but their products were not FDA-approved. Id. The plaintiff brought a Lanham Act suit alleging, among other claims, that the defendants' advertisements misled consumers by representing that their products were approved by the FDA. Id. The defendants argued that this claim should have been dismissed under the doctrine of preclusion because drug regulation is within the exclusive authority of the FDA. Courts have found field preemption to be largely inapplicable in the food labeling context because "[i]t does not appear that Congress has regulated so comprehensively in either the food and beverage or juice fields that there is no role for the states." Both conflict and express preemption, however, present a 200 closer question when they are raised as defenses to state law claims challenging food labels. The NLEA preemption cases present a mixed bag of results, but 201 they can be broken down into four areas. First, in areas where the FDA has clearly set forth a labeling standard and the manufacturer is in compliance with that standard, courts will likely find the state law claim barred by the preemption doctrine because it seeks to impose obligations "different" or "in addition to" those standards set forth by the FDA. Second, in areas where the FDA has 202 clearly set forth a labeling standard and the manufacturer is not in compliance with the standard, courts generally find that the state law claim is not preempted because the plaintiff is seeking to enforce requirements identical to those set forth by the FDA. authorized by the FDA; thus, the plaintiff's state law claims were preempted because they sought "to impose standards that are not identical to those set forth in the regulations."
226
Preemption under the NLEA continues to be a contentious, confusing, and time-consuming issue that ties up litigants and the lower courts for a considerable portion of these cases. It is not the only defense raised to combat private litigation targeted at misleading food labels, however. As discussed below, defendants often assert the primary jurisdiction defense in concert with preemption or preclusion. 3. Primary Jurisdiction.-Like preclusion and preemption, the primary jurisdiction doctrine bears on the relationship between agency enforcement and private litigation. The doctrine has been invoked in cases that involve both federal and state law claims targeted at areas regulated by the FDA. It is 228 confusingly titled, as its invocation does not require a court to dismiss a case because it lacks jurisdiction to hear the dispute; rather, it has been characterized as a prudential doctrine where the court, in its discretion, stays the dispute pending guidance from the agency with "primary jurisdiction" and expertise in the area:
The primary jurisdiction doctrine allows courts to stay proceedings or to dismiss a complaint without prejudice pending the resolution of an issue within the special competence of an administrative agency. A court's invocation of the doctrine does not indicate that it lacks jurisdiction. Rather, the doctrine is a "prudential" one, under which a court determines that an otherwise cognizable claim implicates technical and policy questions that should be addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory authority over the relevant industry rather than by the judicial branch. 229 Not every issue that touches on an area subject to federal regulation should be stayed pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine, however. The doctrine should be invoked sparingly and applied only to those especially complex issues of agency regulation or issues of first impression. The purpose of the primary 230 jurisdiction doctrine is to encourage efficiency in decision-making. Courts 231 typically consider four factors in determining whether to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine: "'(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory scheme that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration.'" The courts' treatment of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in 232 the context of FDA-regulated products has been inconsistent, but a few patterns in application of the doctrine appear to be emerging.
First, courts are more likely to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine where it appears that the FDA will come forward with a relevant rule in the near future. Conversely, it will not be invoked where it appears that the FDA challenging food products alleged to be misbranded as "natural." Some of 236 these actions were stayed pending FDA guidance on the definition of the term "natural."
Given the fact that food labeling falls squarely within the 237 jurisdiction of the FDA, these courts concluded that it would be more efficient, and lead to more consistent results, if the cases were stayed until the FDA spoke on the matter. Other courts suspected that referring their cases to the FDA 238 would be pointless because repeated calls to the FDA for a definition of the word "natural" had gone unanswered. In 2014, the FDA, citing resource constraints, 239 declined to issue a rule on the meaning of the term "natural." Accordingly, 240 courts facing similar "natural" claims today have declined to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine because it appears unlikely that the FDA will answer the "natural" question anytime soon. A similar rationale was applied in the food urged the court to refer the claims to the FDA pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine; however, the court found no indication that the FDA was likely to issue new rules regarding trans-fat or plant stanol esters in the near future. Thus, application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was 244 inappropriate. 245 Second, courts are unlikely to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine where the issue presented is not one that requires agency expertise, such as lawsuits alleging straightforward issues of product misrepresentation. For example, the Reid court determined that it was well-able to rule on the merits of the plaintiff's claims, which primarily involved allegations of consumer fraud: "The issue that this case ultimately turns on is whether a reasonable consumer would be misled by [defendant's] marketing, which the district courts have reasonably concluded they are competent to address in similar cases." Likewise, courts are reluctant 246 to apply primary jurisdiction where the plaintiff's claims involve simple misrepresentations of FDA approval. For instance, in Zakaria v. Gerber Products Co., the district court declined to stay the case pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine where the crux of the plaintiff's claim was that Gerber overstated FDA approval of qualified health claims in connection with labels and advertisements for its infant formula. The plaintiff alleged violations of various 247 California consumer protection statutes and also asserted state law tort claims such as fraud and breach of warranty. Gerber argued that the primary 248 jurisdiction doctrine required the court to refrain from hearing the case since its qualified health claims were regulated by the FDA. The court noted that the 249 primary jurisdiction doctrine should only be applied in complex matters that Congress has clearly placed within the hands of an administrative agency. The 250 court declined to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine in Zakaria, finding that there was nothing particularly complex about the task of evaluating whether Gerber's representations of FDA approval were misleading:
Plaintiff raises neither an issue of first impression nor a complex one. Instead, her claims turn on whether Defendant's representations concerning the health benefits of Good Start Gentle and the FDA's approval of the formula were false or misleading. To be sure in analyzing Defendant's health claims, a factfinder may be required to consider evidence about clinical studies . . . [but] [t]his is not a sufficient basis to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 251 Third, courts may apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine where the lawsuit involves allegations that the defendant has misrepresented the "safety," "effectiveness," or "legality" of a product. In JHP Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Hospira, Inc., for example, the plaintiff brought a Lanham Act claim alleging that the defendant's marketing of its injectable epinephrine product misled consumers by, among other things, representing that its products were safe, effective, and legal. The court suggested that these claims could be subject to 252 the primary jurisdiction doctrine because determinations of a product's "safety" and "effectiveness" may fall within the expertise of the FDA. The court also 253 suggested that representations regarding a product's compliance with applicable laws-including the FDCA-could be subject to the primary jurisdiction doctrine because the question of a product's "legality" under the FDCA is for the FDA to decide:
In short, unlike the binary factual determination of whether Defendants' products are, in fact, FDA-approved, the question of legality directly implicates the FDA's rulemaking authority. The determination of whether a drug is "new," and whether it can be lawfully marketed under the FDCA, involves complex issues of history, public safety, and administrative priorities that Congress has delegated exclusively to the FDA.
254

B. Preclusion, Primary Jurisdiction, and Potential Interagency Conflict
Two of the jurisdictional doctrines discussed above-preclusion and primary jurisdiction-have implications not only for private actors seeking remedies for misbranded food products, but also for other agencies seeking to protect the consuming public. As noted in Part I.A.3, the FDA and the FTC share 255 enforcement authority with regard to representations about a food's health benefits. Historically, the FDA has exercised jurisdiction over food labels, 256 while the FTC has exercised jurisdiction over advertisements. There is not 257 always a bright line between labels and advertisements however, and the 258 potential for jurisdictional confusion arises when the FTC takes issue with health 252. JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 996 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 253. Id. at 1003. However, the court concluded that the plaintiff had alleged no facts to suggest that the defendant's products were unsafe or ineffective; thus, the court declined to decide whether any such claims, had they been properly before the court, would have been barred by the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Id. claims that have been regulated, at least in part, by the FDA. Such is the case in the recently filed lawsuit of Federal Trade Commission v. Gerber Products Co. Gerber has pleaded the affirmative defenses of preclusion and primary 259 jurisdiction, arguing that the FDA is the only agency with authority to address the disputed health claims. 260 The action, filed in October, 2014 in the District of New Jersey, alleged that Gerber violated the FTC Act through the "labeling, advertising, marketing, distribution, and sale" of its infant formula, Gerber Good Start Gentle. The 261 FTC's complaint challenged representations made in a variety of media: television commercials, print advertisements, supermarket displays, a gold sticker affixed to the formula container, and a badge on the formula label. First, it alleged that Gerber made false, misleading, or 269 unsubstantiated claims based on its express or implied representation that "feeding Gerber Good Start Gentle formula to infants with a family history of allergies prevents or reduces the risk that they will develop allergies." Second, 270 the complaint alleged that Gerber expressly or impliedly represented that its formula "qualified for or received approval for a health claim" from the FDA, when, in fact, no such approval was given.
271
The Gerber case provides a vehicle to examine the preclusion and primary jurisdiction doctrines in the context of the overlapping jurisdiction of the FTC and the FDA. The FTC is bringing an action involving-at least in part-health claims on food labels that the FDA has already regulated. As noted in Part I.A., regulation of food labels has traditionally fallen to the FDA, while regulation of food advertising has fallen to the FTC. The FTC has expressed its willingness 272 to defer to the FDA's conclusions with regard to the scientific substantiation of health claims and qualified health claims. Here, the FDA has already evaluated 273 Gerber's scientific evidence, denied approval for an unqualified health claim, and issued a letter of enforcement discretion with regard to a qualified health claim. Thus, to the extent Gerber is playing fast and loose with those 274 determinations, it is clear that the FDA has enforcement authority.
At first blush, it would appear that the FTC is out of bounds and infringing on the jurisdiction of the FDA. The FTC's first claim is that Gerber made false, misleading, or unsubstantiated claims based on its express or implied representation that "feeding Gerber Good Start Gentle formula to infants with a family history of allergies prevents or reduces the risk that they will develop allergies." If the FTC's claim will require the court to reweigh or reevaluate 275 the FDA's findings with regard to the qualified health claim, it is likely that the court will decline to hear the dispute under either the preclusion or primary jurisdiction doctrines. Such a question would require the court to "interpret, 276 apply, or enforce the FDCA" -a circumstance that requires application of the 277 preclusion doctrine. Such an allegation may require the court to tread on areas particularly within the FDA's expertise and may result in a second-guessing of the FDA's determinations, thus implicating the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
On the other hand, the FDA's exercise of regulatory authority does not, as a matter of course, prevent other agencies from regulating similar conduct. It 278 is clear that the FTC has broad authority to bring actions against advertisers for unsubstantiated health claims in advertisements and as illustrated in POM claims in advertisements-particularly those claims that are far afield from the qualified health claims the FDA evaluated and regulated-the FTC's authority to do so is indisputable. Moreover, the more the FTC's complaint is characterized as an action based on Gerber's misrepresentations of the scope of FDA approval for its health claims, the more likely the case will survive preclusion and primary jurisdiction challenges. Indeed, the FTC expressly pleaded such a count in its 281 complaint. Courts have held that a claim based on a misrepresentation of FDA 282 approval is not barred by either the preclusion or primary jurisdiction doctrine.
283
Questions of the existence of FDA approval are simple enough for the court to answer, requiring no special agency expertise.
284
Given courts' recent reluctance to apply the doctrines of preclusion and primary jurisdiction in the context of food products, it seems likely that the 285 FTC will be allowed to pursue its claims, despite the fact that its claims involve two areas traditionally within the jurisdiction of the FDA: qualified health claims and product labels. Regardless, the defendant has pleaded these defenses and 286 if the parties do not settle their dispute, the court will have to answer these jurisdictional questions. Such a battle will undoubtedly be costly and divert the FTC's resources away from the merits of the dispute. As discussed below, a good deal of time, energy, and expense is wasted on these jurisdictional challenges in both the private litigation and interagency contexts. Reform is needed.
III. ANALYSIS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
As outlined in Part I, representations about a food's health benefits can be affected by four overlapping forces: (1) regulation by the FDA of product labels; (2) enforcement actions by the FTC with regard to advertisements; (3) Lanham Act claims by competitors; and (4) state law claims by consumers. The 287 convergence of these forces leads to two separate jurisdictional questions. The first question, discussed in Part III.A, involves the appropriate balance between federal regulation of health claims and private actions seeking redress for misleading health claims. The jurisdictional doctrines of preclusion, preemption, and primary jurisdiction operate as burdensome roadblocks to private enforcement and they serve only to drain judicial resources and delay resolution of disputes on the merits. To remedy this problem, the NLEA's express preemption provision should be repealed and the FDCA should be amended to 288 allow expressly private actions for violations of the NLEA.
The interagency overlap between the FDA and the FTC with regard to food health claim regulation. Health claims on a product label can overlap with health claims in an advertisement and the doctrines of preclusion and primary jurisdiction can be used to bar FTC enforcement actions in this area. Congress should clarify 289 the roles of the two agencies with regard to the regulation of food health claims to neutralize the effects of the preclusion and primary jurisdiction doctrines.
A. Agency Enforcement Versus Private Litigation
The inefficiencies of the FDA and its inability to regulate food labels effectively have been well documented by commentators. Although some 290 commentators suggest that the best way to handle the problem is to provide more funding so that the FDA can do its job better, others propose a complete 291 overhaul of the FDA's food labeling scheme. Still others suggest that the FDA 292 is so hopelessly broken that it cannot be trusted with such a task: "charging the FDA with the task of creating and policing a uniform [front of package] labeling system, when it cannot maintain its current regulatory obligations, seems unsound." Commentators in the latter camp suggest that self-regulation of the 293 food industry is the most effective way to prevent consumer deception: "[S]elfregulation, which does not solely involve the bureaucracy of government rulemaking and enforcement, tends to be more efficient, which ultimately benefits the consumer with lower prices and potentially superior goods or services." As neither additional funding, a comprehensive overhaul of the 294 FDA's labeling system, nor sweeping self-regulation is immediately forthcoming, litigation has stepped in to fill the regulatory void left by the 295 289. See supra Part II.B. 290. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 5, at 15 ("How does the government ensure compliance with the laws . . . especially with so many firms and products to oversee? The answer is simple: it does not. The ratio of enforcement-related activity . . . to the universe of potential enforcement targets is vanishingly small.").
291. See Negowetti, supra note 4, at 22 ("Policing labeling violations is the responsibility of the FDA, not plaintiffs' attorneys. To properly fulfill its statutory mission, the FDA will require an increased budget and the political will to monitor the marketplace.").
292. See Pomeranz, supra note 3, at 620 ("Specifically, the FDA needs the authority to seek civil penalties, prohibit claims proven to be deceptive, and compel companies to turn over their substantiation documents when new claims are proffered. With increased resources and authority, the FDA can meet current public health challenges and adequately ensure that labels are clear and consumers are properly informed and protected.").
293. Black, supra note 35, at 13. If the goal is to keep manufacturers honest about their health claims, there is no doubt that litigation is an effective mechanism for doing so. Even if such suits are unsuccessful, the litigation costs alone are often sufficient to deter manufacturer misconduct. Commentators have noted the importance of private lawsuits in shaping food manufacturers' behavior and they suggest that these 296 lawsuits act as a complement to self-regulation in the industry. Food 297 manufacturers pay attention to lawsuits and work to avoid them: "to circumvent litigation, consumer satisfaction and careful attention to labeling continues to be the top priority." Nothing gets a manufacturer's attention faster than a Lanham 298 Act suit from a competitor or a consumer class action. As the Supreme Court noted in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., competitors are often much more in tune with the advertisements, labels, and marketing strategies of others in their industry than regulators are. Thus, businesses are excellent at sniffing 299 out the misrepresentations of their competitors and they are well positioned to call out those manufacturers who step out of bounds. In addition, they have an incentive to pursue these claims that the FDA does not-the prospect of gaining competitive advantage. A plaintiff in a Lanham Act suit can obtain injunctive relief and damages for the commercial loss suffered as a result of the defendant's misrepresentation. 300 Likewise, consumers are well positioned to bring actions challenging misleading health claims. As the end users of a product, they are the ones who have shelled out good money for a product that makes promises, and they are the ones harmed when that product does not deliver. Again, consumers have incentives to pursue these claims that the FDA lacks-money damages for the lost benefit of the bargain. Moreover, there is a benefit to having food labeling issues decided at the local level rather than the federal level. As Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Professor Diana Winters noted, "state law, both positive enactments and common law requirements, can be tailored in response to the interests of the state's populace . . . Public an enormous set of new responsibilities without providing any appreciable new funding to meet them.").
296. See Thompson, supra note 130, at 895 ("Class action lawsuits are currently, in the absence of an FDA rule, the best solution to define 'natural' and protect consumers against misleading 'natural' claims."); see also Andre, supra note 190, at 252 ("Thus, even though the NLEA is focused on protecting the consumer, it recognizes that it cannot do so in a comprehensive manner and that states should be allowed to fill in the gaps only if they so desire. Supporters of narrow preemption argue that instead of viewing state lawsuits as a burden on manufacturers, it should be framed as allowing states to provide their citizens with the ability to redress their harm.").
297. If private litigation is an effective way to fill the regulatory void left by lax FDA enforcement, then the jurisdictional doctrines of preclusion, preemption, and primary jurisdiction need to get out of the way. It is clear that these defenses are losing steam after the Supreme Court's decision in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.; they will continue to be an uphill battle for defendants. Courts 302 recognize the inability of the FDA to police food health claims and they are taking matters into their own hands. Thus, the trend is to allow more lawsuits 303 to proceed rather than fewer. This trend, however, will likely not prevent manufacturers from asserting these defenses and using valuable court and party resources, thereby delaying judgment on the merits.
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Congress should recognize this trend and act accordingly. Repealing the 305 NLEA's express preemption provision would limit the manufacturer's ability to plead the preemption defense except in those truly meritorious circumstances of conflict preemption (i.e., where it is impossible for the manufacturer to comply with both the federal and the state requirements), thereby allowing courts and parties to spend more time on the merits of consumer claims. Such an act would preserve the federal government's ability to set the NLEA's regulations as the floor of acceptable manufacturer conduct, but it would also allow states to impose additional health claim labeling requirements where appropriate to protect consumers.
In addition, the NLEA should be amended to provide consumers with a private right of action for violation of its labeling requirements. Such contain an express preemption provision; rather it contains a savings clause that allows states to impose more stringent anti-discrimination regulations than those required by federal law. Thus, Title VII sets the floor-not the ceiling-of 314 acceptable employer conduct. Manufacturers have found ways to survive and thrive in the face of potentially inconsistent regulation in these areas; there is no reason to believe they will be unable to adapt in the food-labeling context.
Another objection to allowing private litigation to augment the NLEA is that the benefit of agency expertise would be lost if NLEA violations were litigated by private parties in court rather than decided by experts at the FDA. The idea that the FDA is the only entity qualified to address issues of the scientific foundation for health claims is largely unfounded. Courts and juries hear 315 disputes daily that require them to evaluate scientific evidence. Toxic tort, environmental, medical malpractice, and product liability claims all involve large amounts of expert testimony and complicated scientific issues. Juries handle complex scientific matters every day; they are equally competent to decide matters of scientific importance in the context of food. As illustrated above, private litigation can fill the regulatory gap left by lax FDA enforcement of the NLEA. Courts in a post-Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Co. world have been reluctant to apply the doctrines of preclusion, preemption, and primary jurisdiction to bar private litigation, but these doctrines continue to be asserted and vigorously litigated by defendants. To allow courts 316 to spend more time on the merits and less time on burdensome jurisdictional motion practice, the NLEA's express preemption provision should be repealed and consumers should have a private right of action to enforce the FDA's food health claim regulations. These measures would lessen the impact of the jurisdictional doctrines discussed herein and expressly recognize the roles of the competitor and the consumer in shaping food-labeling policy.
B. Resolution of Interagency Jurisdictional Issues
Not only have jurisdictional doctrines been raised to foil the attempts of private litigants who seek redress for misleading health claims, but they have also been raised in an effort to block enforcement actions by another regulatory agency, the FTC. The traditional division of labor between the FTC and the 317 FDA with regard to such claims is that the FTC has enforcement authority over advertisements while the FDA has authority over labels. But as Federal Trade
318
Commission v. Gerber Products Co. illustrates, the line between a label and an advertisement is not always easy to define, particularly where the FDA has engaged in some regulatory activity with regard to the health claim at issue. 319 Defendants in FTC enforcement actions that address misleading health claims can thus raise the arguments of preclusion and primary jurisdiction in an effort to force the case back into the lap of the FDA, an agency that is unlikely to pursue it. 320 Removing the express preemption provision in the NLEA and expressly 315 . See Winters, supra note 8, at 859 ("This perception, that the expertise of the FDA in the matters under its jurisdiction is primary and superior, is long-standing and provides the basis for judicial deference arguments, as well as the justification for regulation. Here, however, the perception is wrong.").
316. 
C. Industry Guidance
Over the past decade, consumers have seen a large increase in the volume and verbiage of food health claims and this trend does not seem to be going away at any point in the near future. As a result, companies that want to make food health claims on their product labels or in advertisements need to consider (1) how to act in the best interest of their consumers and (2) how to provide reliable information to consumers while minimizing the risk of litigation. Each of these issues is discussed below.
1. Consumer Welfare.-The food and beverage industry should first and foremost be concerned about the effects of food health claims on consumer health and decision-making. Prior research on the marketing of foods and beverages has shown that consumers generally benefit from increased health information on product packages and in advertisements.
Specifically, 321 consumers use the information provided in health claims to make decisions about what is going to be the healthiest food for themselves as well as their family members. Consumers use this information to determine what types and quantities of nutrients are in their food and to understand the effects of these foods on their health. For example, someone who has diabetes needs to know how many carbohydrates are in a food product; an individual who has high cholesterol might want to know how much fat is in a food product. Marketing research also shows that consumers get confused by excess verbiage in qualified health claims and might not have the necessary knowledge to be able to interpret the intention behind the health claim. Given the fact that consumers rely on these 322 representations to make decisions about what and how much to eat and the fact that they tend to be confused by complex health claims, the food and beverage industry should be concerned by how consumers interpret and use such information.
Implications for the Food and Beverage
Industry.-The legal rulings and regulations discussed in the majority of this Article have a significant effect on how information can and should be communicated to consumers. The NLEA mandates that consumers be apprised of the nutritional content of food and beverages. In addition, FDA regulations and FTC oversight bear on the way 323 health claims should to be worded on a product package and in an advertisement. To make all of this as clear as possible to the consumer, 324 producers should carefully consider the claims that they make on products labels, promotions, and advertisements. Food producers making front-of-package claims, which are regulated primarily by the FDA, should keep the claims relatively simple. This could be accomplished in two ways, either by making straightforward nutrient-content claims or by making only those authorized health claims that have been expressly approved by the FDA. In both cases, the language associated with the claim is kept to a minimum, which is usually beneficial for marketers trying to manage the aesthetics of a product package. Adhering to the FDA-approved language for authorized health claims and nutrient-content claims will reduce the likelihood of a consumer class action or an enforcement action by the FTC. With regard to qualified health claims, the 325 FDA requires disclaimers that discuss the scientific certainty of the claim.
326
These disclaimers are often lengthy and cannot reasonably fit on a product label. Manufacturers should resist the temptation to "summarize" these 327 qualifiers in order to fit them onto a product label. Departing from the FDA's 328 recommended disclaimer language opens the manufacturer to consumer lawsuits and FTC scrutiny. For example, it is Gerber's alleged mischaracterization of FDA approval of its qualified health claim that is the subject of the lawsuit filed by the FTC. 329 In other sorts of promotional tools, such as advertisements, marketers find more room to include the disclaiming language of a qualified health claim. As such, members of the food and beverage industry should consider saving qualified health claims for their advertising campaigns, where they have space to include a discussion of the scientific certainty of the claim. Under these circumstances, manufacturers should use the exact, verbatim language recommended by the FDA in its letter of enforcement discretion. Consumers 330 are accustomed to hearing or reading warning and disclaimer language during advertisements in a variety of health-related product categories (e.g., pharmaceuticals, health behavior change programs and products, etc.); accordingly, they will likely not be surprised to hear disclaiming language accompanying health claims in the food and beverage context. In short, manufacturers can deal fairly with consumers and avoid litigation if they ensure that the representations about their products conform to FDA guidelines and are supported by solid scientific research.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the FDA lacks the resources and manpower to monitor every health claim asserted by every food producer. Although lawsuits filed by competitors, consumers, and the FTC can lessen the FDA's burden, the doctrines of preclusion, preemption, and primary jurisdiction create unnecessary roadblocks to these claims. Parties spend too much time litigating these threshold jurisdictional questions, time that would be better spent on the merits of the underlying claims. Congress should remove these barriers to private enforcement by eliminating the NLEA's express preemption provision and creating a private right of action for NLEA violations. In addition, Congress should clarify the roles of the FTC and the FDA with regard to food health claims. Such a clarification would answer the jurisdictional objections posed by defendants in FTC enforcement actions. Finally, manufacturers seeking to avoid litigation and to act in the best interest of their customers should carefully follow FDA guidelines and make only those health representations that are supported by solid scientific evidence. 330 . See Masaitis & Woolley, supra note 8. 331. See Berman, supra note 111, at 102 ("[When making] disease-related claims in advertising, firms should be prepared to show FTC staff that their studies are valid and the results are legitimate . . . Accordingly, advertisers should keep records relating to studies protocols, instructions to and communications with participants, statistical analyses of test data, and any materials relating to sponsorship of their human clinical studies.").
